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THE BATTLE OVER THE DEPRECIABILITY OF GOODWILL:
WAS THE VICTORY WORTH THE WAIT?
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States
113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993)
Tammy L. Barham
I. INTRODUCTION
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in [a]
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the sub-
ject of a depreciation allowance .... No deduction for depreciation is allowable with
respect to goodwill.1
As is tried and true, this simple, broad language set forth by the Internal Reve-
nue Service [hereinafter IRS] as a "clarification" of the Internal Revenue Code
[hereinafter Code] has caused an endless amount of litigation, leading to confu-
sion among courts of law and disparate treatment of taxpayers. 2
1. Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960) (emphasis added).
2. Compare Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 E2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing depreciation of a pur-
chased newspaper's subscription list); Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl.
1976) (allowing depreciation of purchased insurance expirations); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United
States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing depreciation of a purchased newspaper's subscription list), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771 (1990)
(allowing depreciation of purchased banks' deposit base), affd, 984 E2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993); Citizens & S.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463 (1988) (allowing depreciation of deposit base), affdper curiam, 919 F.2d
1492 (11 th Cir. 1990); Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T. C. 223 (1975) (allowing deprecia-
tion of purchased credit reporting business' customer files) with Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1962) (denying depreciation of a purchased medical practice's medical service contracts); Dodge Bros. v. United
States, 118 F2d 95 (4th Cir. 1941) (denying depreciation for the loss of goodwill due to obsolescence); Red Wing
Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926) (denying depreciation for the obsolescence of goodwill),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
As the Second Circuit has noted: "In the realm of intangibles . . . the rulings and decisions are in a state of
hopeless confusion. . . . The taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest and penalties for guessing wrong, is enti-
tled to reasonably clear criteria or standards to let him know what his rights and duties are." Briarcliff Candy
Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The United States Supreme Court has finally laid to rest the enduring contro-
versy3 created through the years as a result of courts trying to balance the idealism
of sustaining a long-standing, traditional law against the rationality of applying
that law. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States answers the fervently-
disputed question4 of whether goodwill is nondepreciable as a matter of law, or
whether it is subject to depreciation once it has been determined to have a reasona-
bly-estimated useful life.'
In essence, goodwill is an intangible value which attaches to a business as a
result of the favorable reputation that business has gained with its customers.' As
one might expect, this "favorable reputation" can be very valuable in monetary
terms in certain customer-driven industries such as the banking, insurance, news-
paper and other print media, and health care industries. However, in the past there
has been no tax benefit to be derived from owning a valuable asset labeled "good-
will."7
Section 167(a) of the Code allows taxpayers to reduce their current federal in-
come tax liability in the form of annual depreciation deductions allowed for the
exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of property that is used in a trade or
3. For commentary on the subject, see, e.g., Martin J. Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassess-
ment of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 28 TAx LAW. 251 (1975); Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a
Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443 (1974); Danny P. Hol-
lingsworth &'Walter T. Harrison, Taxation of Intangibles, 9J.L. &CoM. 51(1989); Marc D. Levy et al., Supreme
Court's Decision on Amortizing Intangibles Removes One Barrier, 79 J. TAX'N 4 (July 1993); Robert J. McDonald,
Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 VA. L. REv. 645 (1959); George Mundstock, Taxation ofBusiness Intan-
gible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179 (1987); Alan S. Schenk, Depreciation of Intangible Assets: The Uncer-
tainty of Death and Taxes, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 501 (1967); Robert W. Wyndelts & Anna C. Fowler, Avoiding
Allocations to Goodwill Under the Asset-Acquisition Rules, 71 J. TAX'N 392 (1989); Note, An Inquiry into the Nat-
ure of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 660 (1953); John L. Cleary, II, Comment, Core Deposit Base: Goodwill or
Not Goodwill-Is That the Question?, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 795 (1990); Comment, Depreciability of Going Con-
cern Value, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 484 (1973); J. Tyler Haahr, Note, Core Deposit Base: A Depreciable Intangible or
Goodwill, 41 TAX LAw. 867 (1988); Daniel P. Meehan, Note, Core Deposit Intangibles andAmortization: Citizens
& Southern Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 44 TAX LAw. 577 (1991); Linda J. Pissott, Note, The Amorti-
zation of Customer-Based Intangibles: The "Separate & Distinct from Goodwill'Requirement and H.R. 3035"s Pro-
posal for Change, 45 TAX LAW. 1031 (1992); Allen Walburn, Comment, Depreciation of Intangibles: An Area of
the Tax Law in Need of Change, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453 (1993).
The depreciability of intangible assets has also been a source of legislative debate. Compare H.R. 563, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing the disallowance of depreciation deductions for all customer-based intangi-
bles) and H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposing that depreciation deductions for customer-based
intangibles be denied) with H.R. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (advocating the allowance of depreciation
over a specified period of time for intangible assets). This legislative debate ended on August 10, 1993, when the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, including the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, was signed into
law by President Clinton. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). Section 197, entitled "Amortization of
Goodwill and Certain Other Intangibles," was added to the Code by the 1993 Act. Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993, tit. XIII, ch. 1, subchapter B, pt. VI, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261, 107 Stat. 312, 532-40
(1993).
4. See supra note 3.
5. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1672 (1993). According to Blacks Law
Dictionary, tangible assets are depreciated, while intangible assets are amortized. Id. at 1683 n. I (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (citing BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 83, 441 (6th ed. 1990)). However, the statute and regulations use only
the term depreciation. Id. For that reason, I use the term depreciation interchangeably for amortization through-
out this Note.
6. ROGER H. HERMANSON ET AL., ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 472 (4th ed. 1989).
7. See infra Part III.B.3.
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business or that is held for the production of income.' As a basic requirement for
depreciation deductions, an asset must have an ascertainable life. 9 Historically,
goodwill has been deemed to have no limited legal life and a useful life that could
not be reasonably estimated.'I As a result, goodwill was deemed nondepreciable
for tax purposes as a matter of law."1
In Newark Morning Ledger, the United States Supreme Court held that once an
intangible asset is determined to have a useful life, it is subject to depreciation, re-
gardless of its relationship to goodwill.12 In light of the plain language of the appli-
cable Treasury Regulation and case law, this result is logical and fair.
This Note offers an in-depth analysis of the decision reached in Newark Morn-
ing Ledger, presenting the relevant facts of the topic case, as well as the decisions
reached by the lower courts. It analyzes the development of the law in the area of
the depreciability of goodwill and provides a detailed explanation of the holding in
the topic case, including the arguments presented, the issues resolved, and the
views of the dissenting Justices. Finally, this Note discusses the implications of the
Court's decision regarding business acquisitions and asset valuation.
II. FACT SECTION
In 1976, the Herald Company [hereinafter Herald], a newspaper publisher,
purchased the outstanding shares of Booth Newspapers, Inc. [hereinafter
8. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988). Obsolescence is a term used to refer to any normal, technological change in an
asset resulting from reasonably foreseeable economic conditions. D. LARRY CRUMBLEY ET AL., WEST'S FEDERAL
TAXATION: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES 9-2 to 9-3 (William H. Hoffman, Jr. et al. eds., 1992). In the event of ab-
normal or rapid obsolescence, a taxpayer may elect to use a shorter estimated useful life upon showing that there
is a clear and convincing basis for the redetermination. Id. at 9-3.
The term depreciation can cause confusion in the area of taxation. Hollingsworth & Harrison, supra note 3, at
63. For example, one early definition of depreciation was "the decrease in exchangeable value of a wasting asset,
computed on the basis of [the] cost expired in seeking profits during the period." Hollingsworth & Harrison,
supra note 3, at 63-64 (citing PERCY D. LEAKE, DEPRECIATION AND WASTING ASSETS 9 (1976)). Any costs in-
curred to seek profits, of which both elements are key in this definition of depreciation, should be treated as ex-
penses in the same period that any income related to those expenses is generated. Hollingsworth & Harrison,
supra note 3, at 64.
On the other hand, compare a more recent definition of depreciation: "A decrease or loss in value because of
wear, age, or other cause." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 355 (William
Morris ed., 1981). The focus of this definition is on the value of the asset, rather than the expiration of cost. To
add to the confusion, neither of these definitions are aligned with the accounting and tax standpoint that depreci-
ation is based on an individual asset's cost. Hollingsworth & Harrison, supra note 3, at 64.
9. See Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
10. HERMANSON, supr note 6, at 473.
11. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. While historically not depreciated for tax purposes, good-
will has generally been depreciated over a period of 40 years for accounting purposes, creating a permanent dif-
ference between the income shown on a company's books and its taxable income. Hollingsworth & Harrison,
supra note 3, at 51. In theory, goodwill must be depreciated for financial accounting purposes in order to avoid
the overstatement of a business' net income, which can result if all expenses are not deducted from their related
revenues. Walburn, supra note 3, at 473 (citing GEORGE R. CATLETT & NORMAN 0. OLSON, ACCOUNTING FOR
GOODWILL 80, Accounting Research Study No. 10 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1968)). "This
requirement is necessary because the value of purchased goodwill will eventually disappear." HERMANSON, supra
note 6, at 473. For all practical and theoretical purposes, this rationale should be recognized by the tax law as
well. Walburn, supra note 3, at 474.
12. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 (1993).
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Booth].13 Herald and Booth effected a merger in 1977, upon which Herald allo-
cated its adjusted basis 4 in the Booth shares among the acquired assets in propor-
tion to their individual fair market values at the time of merger.'" Herald's adjusted
basis in the Booth shares was approximately $328 million and was allocated as fol-
lows: $234 million to various financial and tangible assets; $67.8 million to an in-
tangible asset labeled "paid subscribers;" and $26.2 million to going-concern
value and goodwill.1"
Paid subscribers consisted of 460,000 at-will customers who had requested
regular delivery of the newspapers and who were expected to continue their sub-
scriptions after the Herald acquisition. 17 The value attributed to the paid sub-
scribers was calculated using the "income approach."' 8 First, Herald used
statistical experts to estimate the length of time an average subscriber would con-
tinue to subscribe.' 9 These useful life estimations were based on actuarial factors
such as death and relocation.20 Second, the experts determined the gross revenue
stream that the subscriptions would generate over their estimated useful lives and
calculated its present value. 21 A net revenue stream of $67.8 million from the paid
subscribers asset was estimated by subtracting projected costs of collection from
the present value of the determined gross revenue stream.22
Herald then claimed depreciation deductions for the $67.8 million asset on a
straight-line basis on its income tax returns for the years 1977 through 1980.23
The deductions were disallowed by the IRS because the paid subscribers concept
13.Id. at 1672. Booth published daily and Sunday newspapers in eight Michigan communities: TheAnn Arbor
News, The Bay City Times, The Flint Journal, The Grand Rapids Press, The Jackson Citizen Patriot, Kalamazoo
Gazette, The Muskegon Chronicle, and The Saginaw News. Id. & n.2.
14. The adjusted basis of property is the property's original basis-typically its cost-increased by capital
additions and decreased by recoveries of capital. CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 14-3. Capital additions include the
taxpayer's cost of capital improvements made to the property. CRumBLEY, supra note 8, at 14-3. Capital recover-
ies include depreciation allowances, investment tax credits, and losses resulting from casualty or theft.
CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 14-4.
15. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672. The tax code provisions in effect in 1977 required this type of
allocation. Id. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 332, 334(b)(2) (1976).
Upon the purchase of a business, a buyer must allocate the purchase price first to tangible assets and certain
specifically identifiable intangibles according to their relative fair market values. See I.R.C. § 1060 (1988);
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060- IT(d) (1988). The remaining purchase price must be allocated to "intangible assets
in the nature of goodwill and going concern value." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(d)(2)(iii) (1988). See also
CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 14-9.
16. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672-73.
17. Id. at 1672 n.4.
18. Id. at 1673. The income approach is commonly used because it best reflects the method a purchaser and
seller would use to value intangible assets other than goodwill and going- concern value. Newark Morning Ledger
Co. v. United States, 734 F Supp. 176, 182 (D.N.J. 1990), rev d, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
1670 (1993). The income approach measures the entire net stream of income to be generated by an intangible
asset. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 562.




23. Id. Annual depreciation under the straight-line method is calculated as follows: asset cost, less estimated
salvage value, divided by estimated years of useful life. HERMANSON, supra note 6, at 104.
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was indistinguishable from goodwill and, as a result, nondepreciable under the ap-
plicable Treasury Regulation.24 Herald paid the additional taxes assessed.2"
In 1987, Herald merged with Newark Morning Ledger Company [hereinafter
Newark].2 After the merger, Newark, as successor to Herald, filed a timely claim
for refund of the additional taxes that were paid by Herald upon disallowance of
the depreciation deductions.27 After six months passed,2" during which the IRS
took no action on the claim, Newark brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey to recover the additional taxes paid, plus inter-
est.29
Litigation ensued, and the Government's basic argument for disallowing the
deductions was that the nature of paid subscribers was indistinguishable from
goodwill." Although it stipulated to the expert evidence presented by Newark re-
garding the estimated useful lives of the paid subscribers for each newspaper, the
Government applied a "cost approach" in valuing the asset, 31 submitting that the
value would be equal to the "cost" of generating 460,000 subscriptions -the num-
iler of subscriptions represented by paid subscribers -through a subscription
drive." Using this method, the Government estimated the cost of generating a
commensurate number of subscriptions, and therefore the value of the asset, at ap-
proximately three million dollars.33 The Government argued that the value of the
asset would have to be recovered upon disposal of the business rather than
24. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1673 (1993). Treasury Regulation
§ 1.167(a)-3 states:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the business or in the
production of income for only a limited period,the length of which can be estimated with reasonable ac-
curacy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and
copyrights. An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for
depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported opinion of the tax-
payer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life. No deduction for depreciation is allowable with re-
spect to goodwill.
Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
25. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673.
26. Id. at 1672.
27. Id. at 1673. "A claim for refund generally must be f'led within three years from the date the return was
filed or within two years from the date the tax was paid, whichever is later." CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 1-21.
28. A taxpayer cannot institute a suit against the IRS before six months has passed following a timely claim for
refund. I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (1988).
29. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673. Once a taxpayer decides to pursue litigation, it has the choice
of seeking a "refund" or "non-refund" route. Upon filing suit in a federal district court or the United States Claims
Court, the taxpayer must pay the alleged taxes owed and sue for a refund-the refund route. CRUMBLEY, supro
note 8, at 2-13. If the taxpayer wishes to sue immediately and pay the taxes if it loses its case, it can file suit in the
United States Tax Court- the non-refund route. CRUMBLEY, supr note 8, at 2-13 to 2-14. However, the taxpayer
must consider when filing in Tax Court that interest and penalties will run from the date the taxes are due until the
tax is paid. CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 2-14.
30. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673.
31. Id. The cost approach measures the actual cost of generating a comparable asset. Newark Morning Ledger
Co. v. United States, 945 E2d 555, 562 (3d Cir. 1991), revd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
32. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673.
33. Id.
1994]
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currently deducted since goodwill was nondepreciable as a matter of law, and the
paid subscribers asset was indistinguishable from goodwill."
The district court adopted a two-pronged test: In order to depreciate an intangi-
ble asset, a taxpayer must show that "the asset has[ ] [(1)] a limited useful life, the
duration of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, and [(2)] an ascer-
tainable value separate and apart from goodwill."35 In fact, the parties agreed that
if the court determined that the paid subscribers asset had a useful life which could
be estimated with reasonable accuracy and a value separate from goodwill, then
Newark was entitled to depreciate the asset on a straight-line basis6
Influenced by the competent statistical evidence Newark presented demonstrat-
ing that a limited life could be estimated with reasonable accuracy, the court held it
was self-evident that the asset had a limited useful life because by necessity the
subscriptions would terminate upon the death of the subscribers . It noted that by
definition goodwill has an indefinite life, and since the paid subscribers had limited
lives that were estimated with reasonable accuracy, they represented an asset with
a value separate and apart from goodwill.38 Therefore, as agreed upon by the par-
ties, Newark was entitled to the deductions. 9
The decision reached by the district court was reversed by the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, which held that even if the asset had a limited useful life that
could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, the value of the asset was not sepa-
rate and distinct from goodwill.4" The court of appeals posited that the district
court had used the wrong definition of goodwill.41 Instead, it adopted the defini-
tion that goodwill is the expectation that old customers will continue to do busi-
ness with the company.42 As a result, the court of appeals determined that the paid
subscribers asset was the epitome of goodwill.4" Because there was a perceived
conflict among various circuits regarding the depreciability of goodwill," the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue.4"
34. Id. The IRS posited that Newark should have to add the value of the goodwill to the basis, or cost, of the
business so that upon disposal of the business the cost of goodwill would be deducted from the proceeds received
on sale in computing capital gain or loss. Id. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
35. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176, 184 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd, 945 F2d 555
(3d Cir. 1991), revd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
36. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F Supp. at 180. See supra note 23.
37. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 176, 180.
38. Id. at 182-83.
39. Id. at 180, 185.
40. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 556, 568 (3d Cir. 1991), revd, 113 S. Ct.
1670 (1993).
41. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 568.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1674 & n.5. Compare Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 555
(holding that a newspaper's paid subscribers asset is indistinguishable from goodwill and therefore nondeprecia-
ble as a matter of law) with Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a newspa-
per's paid subscribers asset is depreciable once it is found to have a reasonably-ascertainable life). See supra note
2 and accompanying text.
45. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1674.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Internal Revenue Code
The concept of allowing a deduction for depreciation of an asset has been ex-
plicitly recognized as a part of the federal tax system since 1909, when Congress
authorized corporations to calculate net income by deducting, inter alia, a reason-
able allowance for depreciation from gross income.4" The Tariff of 1909 did not
prohibit depreciation of intangible assets, but that position changed with the pas-
sage of the 1913 Income Tax Law.47 Effective in 1914, Treasury Regulation 33
explicitly provided that depreciation was only applicable to the wear and tear of
physical property, and not to assets that were not affected by use.' This prohibi-
tion excluded intangible assets from the depreciation allowance, except assets such
as patents and copyrights.' 9
The ban on depreciating intangible assets was short-lived. Under the Revenue
Act of 1918, intangible assets were specifically recognized as being subject to the
depreciation allowance. 50 However, it was later ruled that the plain language of the
1918 Act prohibited the depreciation of goodwill because goodwill could not rep-
resent an asset that was susceptible to exhaustion, wear, and tear, as was required
for an asset to be qualified for depreciation under the Act. 5 Since then, the Regu-
lations that govern the depreciability of intangible assets have remained basically
the same.52 The Regulation currently in force specifically exempts goodwill from
depreciation, and the IRS has consistently taken the position that goodwill is non-
depreciable per se since 1927.'
46. Id. (citation omitted). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
47. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1674. An intangible asset lacks physical substance-e.g., goodwill,
copyrights, patents-while a tangible asset has physical substance-e.g., equipment, buildings, etc. CRUMBLEY,
supra note 8, at 9-2.
48. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1674 n.7 (citation omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1674-75 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 1675 n.8 (citing Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cit. 1926), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 763 (1927)). The theory that goodwill has an unlimited life has been questioned. For example, one com-
mentator has pointed out that at a given point in time, goodwill is much more a result of a business' recent activ-
ities rather than a continuation of goodwill that once existed at some time in the business' history. Walburn, supra
note 3, at 468-69 (citing Walter C. Frank, Goodwill Is Not Immortal: A Proposal to Deduct the Exhaustion of Pur-
chased Goodwill, 23 J. TAx'N 380, 381 (1965)). Absent continual efforts to create new goodwill, any goodwill a
business once had will soon disappear. Walburn, supra note 3, at 469 (citing Frank, supra, at 381). There are an
unlimited number of internal and external factors that can erode a business' ability to generate excess earnings
(i.e. goodwill): changes in management, improvements in competitors' products, and changes in technology, to
name a few. Walburn, supra note 3, at 469 (citing Frank, supra, at 380).
52. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1675.
53. Id. See supra note 24.
1994]
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B. The Meaning of Goodwill
1. The Definition of Goodwill
Goodwill has never been defined by the IRS, but since 1893 courts have at-
tempted to articulate a workable definition. 4 Particularly, Boe v. Commissioner es-
tablished a definition of goodwill commonly used by later courts." In Boe, the
taxpayer (Boe) and three of his associates acquired a medical practice upon pur-
chasing the practice's assets, including goodwill, for a lump sum.5 The practice
was run by having patients sign a contract for medical services and requiring the
patients to pay dues to the practice in advance.5 7 In the normal course of business
some of these medical contracts were terminated, and Boe deducted the cost of the
terminated contracts as a business expense on his partnership tax return.
5 8
The IRS disallowed these deductions, classifying them as capital expenditures
rather than deductible business expenses. 9 It argued that the amount paid for the
medical practice, over the amount allocated to fixed assets and inventory, was
goodwill, so that the cost would have to be recovered upon disposition of the busi-
ness rather than currently deducted as a business expense.6"
The central issue in Boe was whether the excess purchase price for the medical
practice, over and above the tangible assets, constituted goodwill or payment for
individual medical contracts . Goodwill was defined as "the expectancy of con-
tinued patronage," and the court determined that the medical contracts were in-
separable from goodwill since their value depended upon Boe and his associates'
54. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1675. In 1893, the Supreme Court considered whether goodwill
survived after a newspaper was purchased and ceased publication under its previous name. Id. In Metropolitan
National Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., the St. Louis Dispatch and the Evening Post were consolidated into one
newspaper called the Post-Dispatch. 149 U.S. 436, 437-39 (1893). Therefore, they ceased operating under their
old names, and the Court ruled that the goodwill of the companies did not survive the name change. Id. at 447.
The Metropolitan Court defined goodwill as the benefit obtained as a result of patronage by habitual customers.
Id. at 446.
In Des Moines Gas Co. v. City ofDes Moines, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the City of Des Moines from enforc-
ing the provisions of a city ordinance fixing gas rates. 238 U.S. 153, 157 (1915). The Court determined that the
value of goodwill should not be included in the valuation of a public service corporation for the purpose of fixing
rates. Id. at 165. The Court defined goodwill as the value inherent in the customers' favorable impression of a
well-known and well-conducted business. Id. at 164-65. This definition was reaffirmed in 1933 in Los Angeles
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
55. 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962). See, e.g., Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 984 F.2d 383
(10th Cir. 1993); Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987); Concord Control, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 615 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1980); AmSouth Bancorporation & Subsidiaries v. United States, 681 F. Supp.
698 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
56. Boe, 307 F.2d at 340.
57. Id.
58. Id. The four owners subsequently split their interests and formed two partnerships, but continued to oper-
ate out of the same offices and use the same records. Id. at 341.
59. Id. at 342. The distinction between a capital expenditure and a business expense is that a business expense
is currently deductible from income while a capital expenditure is added to the basis of the asset and recovered
through annual depreciation. CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 6-23. When an expenditure is classified as capital in
nature, an immediate tax benefit is lost, but the cost of the expenditure can be periodically deducted from income
over a longer period of time. CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 6-23.
60. Boe, 307 F. 2d at 342. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
61. Boe, 307 E2d at 342.
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expectation that they would not be terminated.2 As a result, the distinction be-
tween the excess purchase price paid for goodwill or for medical contracts did not
have to be made: Since the medical contracts were inseparable from goodwill and
goodwill was not depreciable, the deductions were not allowed.63
2. The Purpose of Depreciation
The purpose of tax depreciation from an economic point of view is to attempt to
annually measure the decline in value of a taxpayer's depreciable asset resulting
from that asset's use in the business for the production of income over the asset's
useful life.'
The Supreme Court addressed the purpose of depreciation in Massey Motors,
Inc. v. United States.6" Massey Motors, Inc. [hereinafter Massey] was a franchised
Chrysler dealer.66 Massey made certain assignments and rentals of its cars for
specified periods of time, and later sold the cars after they had accumulated mile-
age to customers .67 Gains on these customer sales were calculated by deducting
Massey's cost basis in the cars, less depreciation taken on the cars, from the sale
price, and applying capital gain rates to the determined net gain.68 For purposes of
depreciation, Massey used the total economic life of the cars for the useful life and
the junk value as salvage value.69
The IRS argued that the useful life was only the actual period when the automo-
bile was used in the business by the taxpayer rather than its total economic life.' It
was also argued that the salvage value was the resale value at the time Massey dis-
posed of the asset rather than its junk value.7 1 As a result of the variations in the
valuations, the IRS disallowed the depreciation deductions.72
The Supreme Court held that the IRS' position was more in line with Congress'
intent in allowing depreciation.7" The primary purpose of depreciation is
62. Id. at 343.
63. Id.
64. Walburn, supra note 3, at 458 (citing MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STU-
DENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 6.08, at 142 (6th ed. 1991)).
65. 364 U.S. 92 (1960). This opinion was a consolidation of two cases: Massey Motors and Commissioner v.
Evans. Id. at 93.
66. Id. at 95.
67. Id. Massey assigned some of its cars to company personnel, selling the cars after 8000 to 10,000 miles of
use, and rented some cars to unaffiliated finance companies, selling them after approximately 40,000 miles of
use. Id.
68. Id. at 95-96. Upon the sale of property, gain is generally calculated by deducting the acquisition cost of the
asset, reduced by any depreciation taken on the asset, from the selling price of the asset. CRUMBLEY, supra note
8, at 3-28. When the asset is capital in nature (see I.R.C. § 1221 (1988)), capital rates are applied to the gain
rather than ordinary rates. CRUMBLEY, suprr note 8, at 3-29. For a general discussion of the distinctions between
capital and ordinary gains, see CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 3-28 to 3-32.
69. Massey Motors, 364 U.S. at 94-95. For an explanation of the straight-line method of depreciation, see
supra note 23.
70. Massey Motors, 364 U.S. at 94.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 106-07. Congress intended that the allowance for depreciation enable the taxpayer to "recover only
the cost of the asset less the estimated salvage, resale or second-hand value." Id. at 107.
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allocating the cost of using an asset to the time period to which it contributes,
thereby providing reliable periodic income statements." By requiring that an as-
set's useful life be related to the period in which the taxpayer reasonably expects to
use the asset in its business, the Court noted that the IRS' approach was more
likely to correctly reflect the actual cost of the asset during the periods the asset
was used in the business.75
This principle was recently reiterated in Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner." In
Indopco, National Starch & Chemical Corporation [hereinafter National Starch]
and Unilever United States, Inc. [hereinafter Unilever] wanted to effectuate a tax-
free transaction under Delaware law whereby Unilever would buy out National
Starch.77 They accomplished their plan pursuant to an IRS private ruling which de-
clared that the transaction would be tax-free, in regard to which the two compan-
ies incurred substantial fees." National Starch claimed a deduction for these
expenses, but it was disallowed by the IRS because the expenses were considered
capital expenses and therefore not deductible as business expenses."
The Court pointed out that the IRS allows current deductions of business ex-
penses in order to correctly match revenue and expenses to their applicable taxable
period.8" For tax purposes, these deductions will result in an accurate calculation
of the period's net income.81 On the other hand, capital expenditures are generally
added to an asset's basis and recovered through depreciation deductions over the
asset's useful life.82 The fees incurred by National Starch were ultimately held to
be capital expenditures and therefore not currently deductible as a business ex-
pense.83
3. The Depreciability of Goodwill
It was first established in Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts that goodwill was
not depreciable.' Red Wing Malting Company [hereinafter Red Wing] manufac-
tured and sold barley malt,8" and as a result of Prohibition, its business was
74. Id. at 104. See supra note 11.
75. Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106 (1960).
76. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). The Court further discussed the underlying distinctions between ordinary and
necessary business expenses and capital expenditures. Id. See supra note 59. The fees incurred by National
Starch were ultimately found to be capital expenditures and therefore not capable of a current deduction as a busi-
ness expense. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1046.
77. lndopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1041.
78. Id. at 1041-42. Letter rulings are issued by the IRS upon a taxpayer's request as to how the IRS will treat a
proposed transaction for tax purposes. CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 2-9. Letter rulings are limited to certain pre-
announced areas of taxation and are only binding on the IRS with respect to the individual taxpayer that sought
the ruling. CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 2-9.
79. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1042. See supra note 59.
80. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1043.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1042. See CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 6-22 to 6-23.
83. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1046.
84. 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
85. Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 627. Barley malt is used in the brewing and distilling of alcoholic beverages.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 791 (William Morris ed., 1981).
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destroyed. 8 Prior to its destruction, Red Wing had goodwill of approximately
$153,600, which became worthless after Prohibition.87 Red Wing then sold its
manufacturing operations.88 The disputed issue in this case was whether Red
Wing was entitled to a business deduction for the loss of its goodwill.89
Red Wing argued that it was entitled to a deduction under section 234(a)(7) of
the Revenue Act of 1918.90 That section provided for "[a] reasonable allowance for
the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, including a
reasonable allowance for obsolescence. ' '"'
Litigation focused on whether the appended phrase of the section providing for
obsolescence created a new, separate basis for a depreciation deduction, or
whether it was only an extension of the previous phrase.92 The court held for the
latter proposition, concluding that since goodwill is not exhausted by the opera-
tion of business and therefore does not become obsolete, depreciation cannot be
charged against it.93 Ultimately, the court held that Congress had not intended for
goodwill to be dealt with separately from the business to which it is attached, so
that Red Wing could not take a deduction for a loss of goodwill separate from its
business." The IRS has taken this position since 1927, the year following the Red
Wing decision.9"
C. The Mass-Asset Rule
The mass-asset rule is used by courts to preclude depreciation of customer-
based intangible assets because in theory they are self-regenerating assets that may
change over time, but never diminish in value. Golden State Towel & Linen
Service, Ltd. v. United States set forth the generally accepted definition of a mass
asset:
[A] purchased terminable-at-will type of customer list is an indivisible business
property with an indefinite, nondepreciable life, indistinguishable from-and the
principal element of-goodwill, whose ultimate value lies in the expectancy of con-
tinued patronage through public acceptance. It is subject to temporary attrition as
well as expansion through departure of some customers, acquisition of others, and
increase or decrease in the requirements of individual customers. A normal turn-
over of customers represents merely the ebb and flow of a continuing property status
in this species, and does not within ordinary limits give rise to the right to deduct for
86. Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 627. Prohibition forbade the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alco-
holic liquors for beverage purposes. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DiCTiONARY 1136 (2d college ed. 1982).
87. Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 627.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 627-28.
90. Id. at 628.
91. Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, 1078 (1918) (current version at 1.R.C. § 167(a) (1988)).
92. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626, 628 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
See supra note 8.
93. Red Wing Malting, 15 F.d at 629, 631, 633. See supra note 51.
94. Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 633-34.
95. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
96. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (1993).
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tax purposes the loss of individual customers. The whole is equal to the sum of its
fluctuating parts at any given time, but each individual part enjoys no separate capi-
tal standing independent of the whole, for its disappearance affects but does not in-
terrupt or destroy the continued existence of the whole. 97
Golden State Towel & Linen Service, Ltd. [hereinafter Golden State] acquired
two of its competitors and allocated a portion of the purchase price to customer
lists.98 It capitalized these lists and sought to deduct a loss for the cost of acquiring
a customer when that customer ceased doing business with it. 9 The issue to be
decided was whether a customer list would be considered an indivisible asset for
tax purposes.1 00
The court held that terminable-at-will customer lists are indistinguishable from
goodwill, representing an indivisible business property in which customer turn-
over is only indicative of the ebb and flow of property that is continuous in nat-
ure.10 1 Further, the individual parts (each customer) of the whole asset (the
customer list) have no separate capital standing because the extinguishment of one
customer does not extinguish the continuity of the whole customer list.102 There-
fore, Golden State was not allowed to deduct a separate loss when individual cus-
tomers ceased doing business with it.103
The Fifth Circuit handed down a decision of great import in Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co. v. United States, in which it held that the mass-asset rule did not
create a per se rule of nondepreciability simply because an intangible asset is re-
lated to goodwill. 104 Houston Chronicle Publishing Company [hereinafter Houston
Chronicle] acquired the assets of the Houston Press Company, which included
subscription lists, inter alia. 05 The lists were valued at $71,200 by taking The
Houston Press' approximate circulation of 89,000 newspapers and multiplying that
number by forty percent to reach a certain number of people estimated to become
subscribers to The Houston Chronicle. 0o This number (35,600) of estimated sub-
scribers was multiplied by the average cost of obtaining new subscribers (two dol-
lars). 107 Houston Chronicle did not intend to continue publication of The Houston
Press, so the customer list was not considered a self-regenerating asset for pur-
poses of the mass-asset rule.10 8 The asset was only valuable to the extent that it
97. 373 F.2d 938, 944 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
98. Id. at 939.
99. Id. See supra note 34.




104. 481 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974). The court also ruled on the
tax treatment of lease acquisition costs and the deductibility of abandonment and demolition losses. Houston
Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1254, 1261.
105. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1243.
106. Id. at 1243-44.
107. Id. at 1244. These figures were not disputed. Id.
108. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (1993).
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furnished the names and addresses of prospective subscribers to The Houston
Chronicle. 109
Houston Chronicle estimated the asset's useful life to be five years and claimed
one-fifth of $71,200- its estimated value - as depreciation each year. 110 Arguing
that the subscriptions were in essence goodwill, so that the asset was nondeprecia-
ble as a matter of law, the IRS disallowed the deductions. 11 Houston Chronicle
argued that it could depreciate the asset under § 167(a) of the Code if it could show
the asset had a limited useful life, of which the duration could be ascertained.' 12
Conversely, the IRS argued that even if such lists were sometimes capable of de-
preciation, Houston Chronicle had not provided sufficient evidence of a useful life
for an allowance of depreciation deductions." 3 The IRS further argued that in any
event, the mass-asset rule applied to bar depreciation of the customer-based
asset." 4
The court opined that most courts applying the mass-asset rule are dealing with
a taxpayer that fails to meet its evidentiary burden.' 5 Thus, the mass-asset rule
did not establish nondepreciability per se and did not prohibit depreciation if the
taxpayer sufficiently met its factual burden of proving the asset had a value distinct
from goodwill and a limited life that could be ascertained with reasonable accu-
racy. 6
Furthermore, determining whether an intangible asset is indistinct from good-
will was a factual question turning on whether sufficient, competent evidence had
proven the limited and ascertainable life of the asset." 7 Goodwill was viewed as an
asset that may fluctuate over time but did not diminish. "8 The court ultimately
held that
newspaper subscription lists such as those before [it] [were] intangible capital assets
that may be depreciated for tax purposes if [the] taxpayer sustains [its] burden of
proving that the lists (1) have an ascertainable value separate and distinct from good-
will, and (2) have a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with
reasonable accuracy." 9
In response to the Fifth Circuit's decision, the IRS issued a new ruling to the
effect that customer-based intangible assets were not indistinguishable from
109. Id.
110. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. V. United States, 481 F2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
111. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1244. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
112. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1244. See infr note 193 and accompanying text.
113. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1244.
114. Id. at 1249.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1249-50.
117. Id. at 1249.
118. Id. at 1248.
119. Id. at 1251.
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goodwill as a matter of law.12° Although the IRS still took the position that these
assets were generally in the nature of goodwill, it recognized that where these as-
sets were susceptible of valuation, they could possibly be depreciated over their
useful lives.12'
The allowance of depreciation deductions for customer-based intangible assets
in light of the mass-asset rule has primarily been a question of fact.122 For exam-
ple, in Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, Richard S. Miller & Sons,
Inc. [hereinafter Miller] purchased insurance expirations from another insurer.
1 23
Depreciation deductions for the insurance expirations were disallowed by the
IRS. 124 The court held that the expirations constituted a mass asset, of which the
useful life related to the whole asset rather than its individual components .121 It
ruled that depreciation deductions were not prohibited by the mass-asset rule if the
individual components could be valued separately and it could be shown that the
whole asset had a limited useful life.1
26
The value of the insurance expirations rested in their renewability, which al-
lowed Miller to estimate a useful life for the purchased asset.' 27 As a result, the
costs associated with collection of the insurance expirations could be depreci-
ated. 
128
In Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that the core
deposit base of a bank could be depreciated. 129 Citizens & Southern Corporation
[hereinafter Citizens] purchased nine separate banks, which included the core de-
posits of each bank. 130 It sought to depreciate the bank-deposit base acquired in
this purchase.13' Citizens valued the deposit base in accordance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles and estimated a useful life through lifing
120. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (1993) (citing Rev. Rul. 74-456,
1974-2 C.B. 65, 66).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1678.
123. 537 F.2d 446, 449 (Ct. CI. 1976). Insurance expirations are procured as follows: When an insurance pol-
icy is issued, a copy of the face of the policy is made showing the name of the insured, the premium, the covered
property, the type of insurance, and the expiration date. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1678 n. 10. This
information allows insurance agents to contact clients when they are in need of new coverage. Pissott, supra note
3, at 1031 n.2. See Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65.
124. Miller, 537 F.2d at 449.
125. Id. at 450.
126. Id. at 452.
127. Id. at 454-55.
128. Id. at 457.
129. 91 T.C. 463 (1988), affd per curiam, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990). The depreciability of the core
deposit base of financial institutions has been the subject of a great deal of commentary. See, e.g., Bank'sAcceler-
ated Depreciation of Core Deposits Upheld, 74 J. TAX'N 44 (1991); Hollingsworth & Harrison, supra note 3;
Haahr, supra note 3; Catherine A. Tanck, Comment, Depreciation of the Core Deposit Intangible: A Tax Incentive
to Acquire a Failed Bank, 32 S.D. L. REv. 80 (1987).
130. Citizens & S., 91 T.C. at 466, 514.
131. Id. at 478. Deposit base is an intangible asset which represents the present value of future income expected
from using purchased core deposits. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 n. 11
(1993).
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studies. 1 2 These studies showed that over a period of time a certain percentage of
the purchased banks' accounts would be closed.133
The Commissioner argued that the purchased core deposits were indistinguish-
able from goodwill.' 34 However, the court held that Citizens could depreciate the
asset because it had established a value and estimated useful life for the deposit
base. '35 Although as old accounts closed new accounts would be opened, the pur-
chased deposit base was not considered self-regenerating. 36
The Tax Court continues to use the mass-asset rule as a guide. 137 In 1991, it
faced the question of whether the value of a trained work force could be depreci-
ated in Ithaca Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner.138 Ithaca Industries, Inc. [herein-
after Old Ithaca] manufactured intimate apparel. 139 To effectuate a leveraged
buyout, New Ithaca Corporation [hereinafter New Ithaca] was formed.4 0 New
Ithaca bought the stock of Old Ithaca, and Old Ithaca was liquidated.141 New
Ithaca then changed its name to Ithaca Industries, Inc. [hereinafter Ithaca].' 42
Ithaca attempted to depreciate the value of the trained work force it had acquired
in the merger over the period of time each employee would remain with the new
company.1
4 3
The court prohibited the deductions via the mass-asset rule. 14 It reasoned that
since Ithaca hired new employees to replace those who left the company, the work
force would not diminish over time or as a result of its use.145 Therefore, when an
employee left, the continued existence of the whole asset was not destroyed be-
cause a new employee was hired to keep the work force unchanged.
146
In Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, Colorado National
Bankshares, Inc. [hereinafter Colorado National] bought seven banks and sought
to depreciate the difference in value between the interest paid on the core deposits
of those banks and the rate of interest at which Colorado National was going to
132. Citizens & S., 91 T.C. at 467-78. To establish standards for businesses to use in recording the economic
effects of their transactions and in reporting these effects to outside parties, the accounting profession issues au-
thoritative pronouncements in the form of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, otherwise known as
"GAAP." Walburn, supm note 3, at 472 n.93.
133. Citizens & S., 91 T.C. at 467-78.
134. Id. at 480.
135. Id. at 479,514.
136. Id. at 499.
137. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (1993).
138.97 T.C. 253 (1991), affd, 17 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 1994).
139. Ithaca Indus., 97 T.C. at 255.
140. Id. at 255-56.
141. Id. at 256.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 261.
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reinvest those core deposits. 147 The IRS classified these core deposits as part of the
acquired goodwill and disallowed the deductions.
The Tax Court noted that core deposits are valued upon the probability that cus-
tomers will leave their money on deposit for certain periods of time, not for an
uncertain span of time in the future. 149 Since Colorado National was able to present
an accurate prediction of a useful life for the core deposits, the court held them
separate from goodwill and capable of valuation for depreciation deductions. 50
D. Donrey, Inc. v. United States
The Eighth Circuit considered the question of whether subscription lists pur-
chased by a newspaper are depreciable in Donrey, Inc. v. United States. 5' Upon
purchasing the Washington Times Herald, Donrey, Inc. [hereinafter Donrey] de-
preciated the portion of the purchase price that was allocable to subscription lists,
and the IRS disallowed the deduction.' 52 While the IRS argued that the list was a
part of goodwill, a jury found that the asset was distinct from goodwill, and that
Donrey had reasonably ascertained its limited life." 3 The court followed the test
given in Houston Chronicle, supra, and held the asset was depreciable because the
jury found it had a reasonably-ascertained useful life.154
In agreement with the IRS, the dissent in Donrey argued that this asset repre-
sented goodwill."' It further distinguished Houston Chronicle, reasoning that
Houston Chronicle planned to discontinue the publication of the paper it pur-
chased. 56 Goodwill is thought to be acquired where the "transfer enables the pur-
chaser to step into the shoes of the seller."5 7 The dissent argued that in this case
Donrey just stepped into the shoes of the Washington Times Herald and, as such,
the asset represented goodwill.5 8
IV. INSTANT CASE
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States answers the question of whether
the IRS can treat intangible assets as nondepreciable strictly because they are con-
sidered goodwill, even after they are proven to have a reasonably-ascertained,
147. 984 F.2d 383, 384 (10th Cir. 1993).
148. Id.
149. Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 789 (1990), affd, 984 F2d
383 (10th Cir. 1993).
150. ColoradoNat7, 984 F.2d at 387.
151. 809 F.2d 534, 535 (8th Cir. 1987).
152. Id. at 535. See supra note 15.
153. Donrey, 809 F.2d at 536.
154. Id. at 537.
155. Id. at 539 (Bright, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 538.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 538-39.
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limited useful life.' Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion, in which
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. 6
A threshold question before the Court was whether Newark had used the cor-
rect approach in valuing the paid subscribers asset. 1 Newark used the income ap-
proach to value the asset based on its net revenue stream.162 While the
Government argued that the appropriate method of valuation was the cost ap-
proach, it offered no evidence challenging the accuracy of the income approach
used by Newark.'63 Ultimately, the Supreme Court accepted Newark's approach
and rejected the cost approach.'
The Government had argued that the only way to appropriately value the asset
was to determine the cost of generating a list of new subscribers."'6 However, the
Court pointed out that the Government had mischaracterized the asset. 66 The evi-
dence presented at trial proved that the paid subscribers provided a periodic, pre-
dictable source of income over a certain period of time and did not represent just a
list of names and addresses. 6 7 Valuing the asset based on the generation costs of a
list of new subscribers would be futile because that value would represent an en-
tirely different asset.' 8
In response, the Government argued that the income approach only measures
an entire revenue stream without reductions for the corresponding expenses,
rather than the net income associated with the asset.'6 9 The only costs Newark
subtracted from the revenue stream were delivery and collection costs.'70 Addi-
tional costs, like production costs, were never considered."'7 However, the Gov-
ernment offered no competent evidence to refute Newark's evidence of
valuation.' 72
Newark relied on a two-pronged test to depreciate an intangible asset under
§ 167 of the Code. 73 The first prong dealt with the intangible asset having a rea-
sonably-ascertained, limited useful life. " At the district court level, the Govern-
ment stipulated that if the district court found that the asset had a useful life that
could be estimated with reasonable accuracy, then the asset could be depreciated
159. 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1672 (1993).
160. Id. at 1671.
161. Id. at 1682.
162. Id. at 1673. See supra note 18.
163. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673. See supra note 31.
164. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1682-83.




169. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F Supp. 176, 182 (D.N.J. 1990), revd, 945 F.2d 555
(3d Cir. 1991), revd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
170. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 182.
171. Id.
172. ld.
173. Id. at 184. See infra note 193.
174. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F Supp. at 184.
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over its applicable useful life.175 The Supreme Court recognized that this stipula-
tion made Newark's burden of proof significantly lighter because Newark would
not have to prove the specific useful life of the paid subscribers or that they were
correctly estimated."17 Instead, the expert testimony need only establish that the
useful life of the asset could be estimated with reasonable accuracy.177
The second prong of the test, and another aspect of the Government's stipula-
tion, was that the court would have to determine that the asset had a value separate
and distinct from goodwill.178 The Government argued that the paid subscribers
were indistinguishable from goodwill, and, therefore, nondepreciable, but con-
ceded that goodwill characteristically has no determinate useful life.179 Goodwill
has also been described as nondepreciable because it has no useful life that can be
reasonably ascertained. 8 ' The Court reasoned that if a taxpayer could prove that
an asset's value wastes over a certain period of time with reasonable accuracy,
then the asset would be depreciable under § 167 of the Code regardless of whether
it was related to goodwill. "'
The Supreme Court pointed out that the purpose of the Code in allowing deduc-
tions for depreciation is to match revenues with their corresponding expenses in
order to more accurately calculate net income for tax purposes.182 Since the paid
subscribers waste over an ascertainable period of time, the Court held that allow-
ing the depreciation deduction would be more faithful to the purposes of the
Code. "
The relevant question for purposes of depreciation was whether the asset was
capable of valuation and whether its value would diminish over time, not whether
the asset represented goodwill.' 84 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the IRS
itself had articulated this principle as follows: "'Whether or not an intangible as-
set, or a tangible asset, is depreciable for Federal income tax purposes depends
upon the determination that the asset is actually exhausting, and that such exhaus-
tion is susceptible of measurement.' "185
Newark argued further that the mass-asset rule did not apply to bar deprecia-
tion because the paid subscribers asset was not self-regenerating.186 Earlier in the
litigation, the court of appeals had suggested that the mass-asset rule was
175. Id. at 180.
176. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1681 (1993) (quoting Newark Morning
Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 181).
177. Id.
178. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 180.
179. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673, 1680.
180. 5 JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23A.01, at 7 (Weinstein et al. eds.,
1990). See supra note 51.
181. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680-81.
182: Id. at 1680 (quoting Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992)). See supra notes 64-
83 and accompanying text.
183. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680.
184. Id. at 1681.
185. Id. (quoting Rev. Rul. 68-483, 1968-2 C.B. 91-92).
186. Id.
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outdated,187 but the Supreme Court pointed out that the Tax Court continues to ap-
ply the rule in cases involving certain intangible assets.188
For purposes of the mass-asset rule, the Court supported the reasoning of the
district court that since there was no automatic replacement for a cancelled sub-
scription, the asset was not self-regenerating. 189 Even though the number of total
subscribers may have stayed relatively the same, the asset did not consist of con-
stantly fluctuating components.19 Replacements for the cancelled subscriptions
could have only been gained through the substantial efforts of Newark.1 91 There-
fore, the mass-asset rule did not apply to prohibit the depreciation of the paid sub-
scribers asset. 
192
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the court of appeals and
held that Newark had sufficiently proven that the paid subscribers asset possessed
the attributes necessary to qualify for a depreciation deduction under § 167 of the
Code, regardless of whether the asset represented goodwill. 193
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scaliajoined. 194 Justice Souter argued that the paid subscribers
represented an unmistakeable measurement of goodwill, and the asset was there-
fore nondepreciable as a matter of law. 195 Furthermore, the dissenters believed
that Newark's experts failed to show that the goodwill had a definite lifespan. 19
6
The dissent pointed out that the Treasury Regulation in question is more than
sixty-five years old and has been reenacted without substantial change only six
times since 1919.197 Judicial interpretations of the Regulation have resulted in a
general definition that goodwill is the expectation that customers will continue
their patronage.1 98 Further, Congress is presumed to have accepted the treatment
of goodwill set out in the Regulation, as clarified through subsequent judicial deci-
sions, because of the essentially unaltered language of the Regulation over the last
187. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 561 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670
(1993).
188. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (1993).
189. Id. at 1681 (quoting Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176, 180 (D. N.J. 1990),
rev'd, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), revd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1683.
193. Id. Section 167(a) of the Code states:
(a) General rule
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and
tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) -
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988).
194. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1671-72 (1993).
195. Id. at 1684 (Souter, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1683. '
197. Id. at 1685. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
198. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1684 (Souter, J., dissenting). See supra notes 54-63 and accompa-
nying text.
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sixty-five years.199 Justice Souter accused the majority of invading the political
domain by attempting to rewrite a Treasury Regulation.200
The dissent found Newark's interpretation of goodwill- as being a residual as-
set equal to any portion of the purchase price of a business that does not corres-
pond to assets with determinate lives -troubling.201 Justice Souter stated that
Newark's definition of goodwill, as accepted by the majority, was a blatant rejec-
tion of Congress' long-standing interpretation of a statute.202
The dissent noted that once it was clear that the paid subscribers asset came un-
der the accepted judicial definition of goodwill, it was evident that the deprecia-
tion of the asset was barred by the express language of the Regulation. 23 The plain
language of that Regulation has been uniformly applied to prohibit depreciation of
goodwill as a matter of law.204
In light of Newark's position on the depreciability of goodwill, the dissent sec-
ondarily presented an argument concerning Newark's expert evidence: Newark's
expert failed to show the asset had a definite duration, as required for the deprecia-
tion of an intangible asset under § 167(a) of the Code.
2 5
The dissent argued that Newark claimed to be entitled to depreciation of a
purchased asset and not an asset attributable to efforts made after the purchase
date.206 Justice Souter reasoned that Newark's expert based his opinion on the pre-
sumption that the total number of subscriptions would remain constant over
time.207 This assumption supposed that the newspaper would remain attractive to
the subscribers through Newark's efforts in running the newspaper business, in ef-
fect predicting the estimated life of the purchased asset combined with customer
satisfaction through Newark's post-sale efforts .208 Newark's expert did not show
when the purchased asset's separate value - as compared to the post-sale continua-
tion of customer satisfaction -would deteriorate.209 Consequently, the dissent
contended that Newark failed to prove the duration of the date-of-sale asset, but
instead proved the periods over which the subscribers existing on the date of sale
would continue to subscribe.210
199. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1685 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1684-85. See supra note 15.
202. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1684-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 1684. See supra note 24.
204. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1684 (Souter, J., dissenting). See supra notes 84-95 and accompa-
nying text.
205. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1686, 1688-89 (Souter, J., dissenting). See supra note 193.
206. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1687.
208. Id. at 1687-88.
209. Id. at 1688.
210. Id. at 1688-89.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Development of the Law
1. The Depreciability of Goodwill
Since 1927, the IRS has taken the position that goodwill is nondepreciable as a
matter of law.211 In direct contrast, the majority in Newark Morning Ledger rea-
soned that once an asset has been proven with reasonable accuracy to have a value
that wastes over a certain period of time, that asset is subject to depreciation under
§ 167 of the Code whether or not it is related to goodwill.
2 12
Looking at the plain language of Treasury Regulation § 1. 167(a)-3, this reason-
ing appears logical. The Regulation clarifies the allowance for depreciation of in-
tangible assets by pointing out that while intangible assets with limited lives -of
which the length can be reasonably estimated - may be subject to depreciation, an
intangible asset without a limited life is not subject to depreciation. 213 The Regula-
tion goes further to state that "[n]o deduction for depreciation is allowable with re-
spect to goodwill .'214 It therefore follows that goodwill is an intangible asset
without a limited life, and the specific bar of depreciation for goodwill seems only
to provide an example of such an asset.215 However, intangible assets with a rea-
sonably-ascertained useful life are subject to depreciation under the Regulation.21 6
The majority in Newark Morning Ledger found that the intangible asset paid
subscribers had a limited useful life that was reasonably estimated. 217 Although
this asset was related to goodwill, it was not goodwill by definition because it had
a reasonably-estimated limited useful life. 218 Therefore, it was not barred by the
per se nondepreciability of goodwill.219
The plain language of the Regulation provides the fatal flaw. While providing
for the depreciation of intangible assets with limited lives and the specific exclu-
sion of goodwill, the Regulation ignores the myriad of intangible assets that are so
similar to goodwill that they are described as indistinguishable from it. 22' The lack
of a forthright rule addressing this particular issue has led to endless litigation in
this area. 221 As a result, the plain language of the Regulation itself has forged a rad-
ical departure from the traditional treatment of goodwill. 222
211. Id. at 1675 (Blackmun, J.). See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
212. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1680-81 (1993).
213. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960). See supra note 24.
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
215. See supra note 51.
216. Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
217. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 (1993).
218. Id. at 1680 n.13.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part III.B.3-D; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
222. See discussion infra Parts V.B-VI.
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Theoretically, this departure finally engenders consistent treatment of pur-
chasers of tangible assets and purchasers of intangible assets.223 While intangible
assets do not possess the same inherent wasting characteristic as tangible assets,
they do lose their ability to generate income after a certain period of time.224 Prior
to the 1993 Act, the failure to reduce a business' income due to the expiration of
the cost of intangible assets, which was allowed for tangible assets, resulted in the
understatement of the business' economic cost of seeking profits and therefore re-
sulted in the erroneous reflection of its income.225
2. The Mass-Asset Rule
The mass-asset rule226 seems to support the proposition that all customer-based
intangibles are nondepreciable as a matter of law.227 However, the Fifth Circuit es-
tablished in Houston Chronicle, supra, that the mass-asset rule does not provide a
per se rule of nondepreciability whenever an intangible asset is related to good-
will. 228 The test developed in Houston Chronicle is that an intangible asset can be
depreciated "if the taxpayer properly carries his dual burden of proving that the
intangible asset involved (1) has an ascertainable value separate and distinct from
goodwill, and (2) has a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascer-
tained with reasonable accuracy. "229
The IRS suggested that the Houston Chronicle test supports the notion that
where an intangible asset is found to be separate and distinct from goodwill, it is
depreciable, so that the Houston Chronicle Court did not intend to change the tradi-
tional definition of goodwill .23 The Newark Morning Ledger court of appeals
pointed out that the large majority of authority weighs in favor of the IRS' interpre-
tation of the Houston Chronicle test. 231' To illustrate, the court cited fourteen cases
decided after Houston Chronicle.232 However, the IRS only prevailed in six of the
fourteen cited cases, which seems to discredit the argument that there is an enor-
mous weight of authority in favor of the IRS' position.233
The court of appeals went further to suggest that the mass-asset rule is out-
dated, characterizing the recent cases involving the mass-asset rule as nothing but
223. For an illustrative example of how the pre-1993 Act tax law led to inequity in the treatment of similarly
situated taxpayers, see Walburn, supra note 3, at 455-56.
224. Hollingsworth & Harrison, supra note 3, at 65.
225. Hollingsworth & Harrison, supra note 3, at 65. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 96-150 and accompanying text.
227. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1676-77 (1993).
228. Id.
229. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1129(1974).
230. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 562 (3d Cir. 1991), revd, 113 S. Ct. 1670
(1993).
231. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 565.
232. Id. at 565-66.
233. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1679 n. 12 (1993) (citing Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Newark Morning Ledger: A Threat to the Amortizability ofAcquired Intangibles, 55 TAX NorEs 981, 984
(1992)).
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a "minority strand," 23 4 but the Supreme Court pointed out that the Tax Court still
employs the rule as a guide to the treatment of certain intangible assets.23 5 More
importantly, the IRS issued a ruling in response to Houston Chronicle asserting
that customer-based intangible assets are not indistinguishable from goodwill as a
matter of law, thereby accepting the possibility that an intangible asset, customer-
based in nature, could be depreciated over its useful life.23 6
Supposing that the court of appeals rejected the mass-asset rule as outdated in
order to discredit the Houston Chronicle test, the court of appeals' argument is
weak. The Supreme Court found that the case law developed since the Houston
Chronicle decision in 1973 presents a persuasive approach in dealing with cus-
tomer-based intangible assets.23 7 Together with the IRS' ruling in response to the
Houston Chronicle decision, the case law seems to establish a modern trend rather
than a "minority strand."
3. The Dissent's View
The dissent's basic argument was that there was a long-standing, congressio-
nally-accepted treatment of goodwill and that the majority opinion was an attempt
to rewrite the well-settled law in this area, thereby usurping Congress' role.23 8
However, the majority stated that it had not changed § 1. 167(a)-3 of the Regula-
tions in the least. 23 9 Rather, the Court stated that it had simply interpreted it to
mean that if an intangible asset is found to have a reasonably-ascertained value and
a limited useful life, it is by definition not goodwill, and therefore depreciable. 2 °
This interpretation in no way changes the well-settled law, as it leaves intact the
proposition that goodwill is nondepreciable under the Regulation.241
The majority's interpretation is well-supported when viewed in light of the
plain language of the Regulation. The Regulation specifically states that intangible
assets with limited lives may be subject to depreciation while intangible assets
with indefinite lives - like goodwill - are not subject to depreciation. It neces-
sarily follows that goodwill has an indefinite life, and an intangible asset with a
definite life is not goodwill. Therefore, an intangible asset with a definite life is
subject to depreciation.
Secondarily, the dissent argues that by applying Newark's position on the treat-
ment of goodwill under § 167(a) of the Code, its expert testimony failed to prove
the asset had the requisite definite life. 2" Justice Souter pointed out that Newark's
234. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 561,565.
235. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1677.
236. Id. (quoting Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65, 66).
237. Id. at 1680 n. 12.
238. Id. at 1680 n.13.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1680-81 & n.13.
241. Id. at 1680 n. 13.
242. See supra note 24.
243. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1686, 1689 (1993) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). See supra note 193.
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expert predicted the estimated life of the purchased asset combined with the cus-
tomer satisfaction from Newark's post-sale efforts, thereby failing to prove the
separate estimated life of the purchased asset at issue.246
While this argument appears valid, the problem lies in the failure of the
Government to present any evidence in contradiction of Newark's expert testi-
mony at the district court level .24 The Supreme Court pointed out that Newark
faced a significant burden of proof, one that is often too great to overcome. 4
However, Newark's evidence was the only evidence presented regarding the asset's
useful life.247 Since the Government rested its entire case on a legal proposition
that would later be rejected by the Supreme Court, the case was lost at trial.24
B. Implications - The Enactment of§ 197
1. The Effect of§ 197
In order to eliminate the dispute over the depreciability of goodwill faced by the
Supreme Court in Newark Morning Ledger, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993249 added a new section to the Code. Generally, § 197 requires that the cost of
purchased intangible assets, including goodwill, be depreciated over a period of
fifteen years .25' This new Code section effects a substantial change in the treat-
ment of goodwill and is likely to have far-reaching implications.
Effective August 10, 1993, taxpayers are allowed to claim deductions for de-
preciation of "amortizable section 197 intangibles. '"251 These intangible assets
must be held in connection with a trade or business or for the production of in-
come. 2 2 Section 197 applies regardless of whether an intangible asset is purchased
as a part of a trade or business, subject to certain exceptions, as long as the asset is
used in a business.25 3
Section 197 intangibles include, inter alia, goodwill and going-concern value,
workforce in place, customer-based intangibles, and bank-deposit base.2"4 Since
244. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
245. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176, 182 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 555
(3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
246. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1681.
247. Id. at 1682 n.14.
248. Id.
249. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, tit. XIII, ch. 1, subchapter B, pt. VI, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13261, 107 Stat. 312, 532-40 (1993).
250. RESEARCH INST. OF AM., THE RIA COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993
402, 2038 (1993) [hereinafter RIA].
251. ld. 401-02, at 85.
252. Id. 402, at 86. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988).
253. RIA, supra note 250, 402, at 86. Section 197 also provides for the depreciation of intangibles that are
allowed to be treated as acquired under the Code. RIA, supra note 250, 402, at 86. For example, under § 338 a
taxpayer can elect totreat  stock purchase as an asset purchase. RIA, supra note 250, 402, at 86. Section 197
would allow the taxpayer to depreciate this asset as long as it is held in connection with a trade or business or for
the production of income. RIA, supra note 250, 402, at 86.
254. RIA, supra note 250, 402, at 86.
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these assets are commonly purchased and sold in business transactions, 255 § 197
will have a broad application and serve an important function in the planning of the
acquisition of businesses.
Practically every business acquisition contains elements of goodwill and going-
concern value. Goodwill is the value that attaches to the expectation that the cus-
tomers of the purchased business will continue to do business with the acquiring
company. 256 Going-concern value is that value that attaches to the purchased busi-
ness' ability to continue operating and producing income in light of the change in
ownership. 2 7 These elements are inherent in the purchase and sale of businesses
and are often the basis for an increased purchase price. Although Newark Morning
Ledger significantly altered the availability of depreciation for intangible assets, it
did not change the per se ban on the depreciation of goodwill.258 Section 197 spe-
cifically provides for the depreciation of goodwill, a fact that allows taxpayers to
depend on a favorable tax treatment of this asset when they are bargaining for the
purchase of a business.25 9
Typically, purchasers of an ongoing business allocate a portion of the price to a
workforce asset.2 60 Rather than having to hire and train a new workforce, the pur-
chaser has an experienced, highly-skilled workforce on the date of acquisition. 26'
Before the 1993 Act, the IRS viewed these assets as representative of the going-
concern value of the business, making them nondepreciable.262 Under § 197,
these assets are subject to depreciation over fifteen years, including the costs of
purchasing employee and consultant contracts.63
Another aspect of business valuation is that of assets which represent the exist-
ence of a real or potential customer base.264 This category includes subscrip-
tion lists, investment management contracts, insurance in force, or other
255. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 15-44 (2d ed. 1975); LESTER G. TELSER, COMPETITION,
COLLUSION, AND GAME THEORY 356-57 (1972); Richard L. Doernberg & Thomas D. Hall, The Tax Treatment of
Going-Concern Value, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 353 (1984); D. Louis Glaser, The Case for Parity Between Tax-
Exempt and Nonexempt Purchasers in Asset Acquisitions, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 753 (1990).
256. RIA, supra note 250, 404. See supr notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
257. RIA, supra note 250, 404. The going-concern value of a business is deemed to exist as long as the busi-
ness remains in operation. Hollingsworth & Harrison, supra note 3, at 55. For that reason, prior to the 1993 Act
the cost of acquiring the going-concern value of a business could not be deducted as an expense for tax purposes,
but had to be permanently capitalized. Hollingsworth & Harrison, supra note 3, at 55. See infra note 259 and
accompanying text.
258. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 n. 13 (1993).
259. RIA, supra note 250, 403, at 88. Annual depreciation deductions are always preferable to deductible
losses or reductions in taxable gain on the sale of a business because annual deductions allow a taxpayer to reduce
its current tax liability each year while the acquired business is in operation. Walburn, supra note 3, at 471. A
deductible loss or reduction in taxable gain becomes beneficial only upon sale of the business, which may occur
several years in the future. Walburn, supra note 3, at 47 1. By receiving a current year deduction as opposed to a
deduction in the future, a taxpayer can either use the then-available funds for investment purposes or to meet
immediate cash needs. Walburn, supra note 3, at 471.
260. RIA, supra note 250, 406.
261. RIA, supra note 250, 406.
262. RIA, supra note 250, 406. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
263. RIA, supra note 250, 406.
264. RIA, supra note 250, 413.
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representations involving the future provision of goods or services to cus-
tomers.26 One hallmark of a business entity is that it generally operates on the
support of customer relationships, whether the customers are wholesalers, retail-
ers, ultimate consumers, clients, or patients. Under § 197, the cost of customer-
based intangibles is depreciable per se, and the taxpayer is not required to establish
a useful life or separate value for them.266
An important inclusion under § 197 intangibles for financial institutions is that
of deposit base. 217 Deposit base has been classified as a customer-based asset, and
was therefore, prior to the 1993 Act, only depreciable to the extent that it was
proven to have a separate value and useful life.2 8 Section 197 provides for an auto-
matic depreciation allowance for the core deposit base of financial institutions.26 9
2. Self-Created Intangibles
Prior to the 1993 Act, if a taxpayer incurred costs to create, maintain, or en-
hance an intangible asset's value, those costs could be currently deducted from in-
come as an ordinary and necessary business expense.270 Such costs include, inter
alia, advertising expenses, research and experimental costs, and costs incurred to
train employees. 271 Section 197 excludes self-created intangibles, subject to excep-
tions,272 and in effect retains the prior rules regarding current deduction of
costs. 273 In essence, a taxpayer must capitalize the cost of purchasing an intangible
asset, but may currently deduct the cost of creating or maintaining it.
274
Section 197 offers an added benefit by retaining the prior rules. Typically, tax-
payers will prefer an allowance for a current expense deduction over a capital ex-
penditure because the current expense deduction will offset current income
resulting in a lower current tax obligation. On the other hand, the taxpayer that
capitalizes an expense will add that expense to the basis of the affected asset and
recover its cost through later depreciation deductions.
265. RIA, supra note 250, 413.
266. RIA, supra note 250, 413.
267. RIA, supr note 250, 1415. See supra note 131.
268. RIA, supra note 250, 413.
269. RIA, supra note 250, 415.
270. RIA, supra note 250, 427. See supra note 59.
271. RIA, supra note 250, 427.
272. Covenants not to compete that are made upon acquiring an interest in a trade or business, trademarks and
tradenames, franchises, and certain government-granted licenses and permits are self-created intangibles which
are depreciable under § 197. RIA, supra note 250, 427.
273. RIA, supra note 250, 1427. Prior to the 1993 Act, two similarly situated taxpayers- a developer of good-
will and a purchaser of goodwill-were treated differently by the law. Walburn, supra note 3, at 470. A developer
of goodwill was allowed to immediately deduct expenditures made for the creation of goodwill, like advertising
and research and development costs. Walburn, supra note 3, at 470. Because the developer may not yield signifi-
cant revenues for several years, it typically was able to defer the recognition of revenue created by these expendi-
tures to future years. Walburn, supra note 3, at 470. These rules of law are still in effect. RIA, supra note 250,
427.
On the other hand, the purchaser of goodwill was denied current depreciation deductions and would normally
expect revenue to be generated by the goodwill immediately after the purchase of an ongoing, profitable business.
Walburn, supra note 3, at 470.
274. RIA, supra note 250, 427. See supra note 59.
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As a result of § 197, taxpayers not only get a specific, newly-created allowance
for depreciation of goodwill, but they also get to adhere to the pre-1993 Act rules
allowing for current deduction of expenses incurred in creating and maintaining
goodwill.27 By granting new deductions and allowing for deductions that only
serve to preserve goodwill for the future, § 197 offers a tangible benefit to taxpay-
ers.
3. The Pros and Cons of § 197
Under § 197 all intangible assets must be depreciated over fifteen years, regard-
less of whether the asset's useful life is more or less than fifteen years. 27' This ben-
efits purchasers of intangible assets which, prior to the 1993 Act, were depreciated
over useful lives longer than fifteen years because they are able to recover their
cost more quickly. Also, § 197 provides for a previously non-existent depreciation
deduction for goodwill.277
Another benefit provided by § 197 is the elimination of controversy over the
allowance of depreciation for certain intangible assets, as evidenced by Newark
Morning Ledger.2 78 Section 197 intangibles are usually allotted a large monetary
value, and § 197 provides purchasers of businesses a degree of certainty about
how the intangible asset will be treated for tax purposes.27
Section 197 employs the residual method of valuing intangible assets.28 This
method requires that the purchase price of a business first be allocated to assets
other than § 197 intangibles.281 The excess, or residual, amount is then allocated
to all § 197 intangibles.282
When a taxpayer has purchased a group of § 197 intangible assets and suffers a
loss on one of those assets, either through disposition, worthlessness, or abandon-
ment, § 197 bars the taxpayer from taking a current loss deduction until the tax-
payer disposes of the last asset in the group of intangibles acquired in the
purchase." On the other hand, gain will have to be recognized on the disposition
of each individual intangible asset. 2" For this reason, separate valuation and iden-
tification of each § 197 intangible purchased in a group will be necessary to deter-
mine whether a subsequent disposition results in a recognizable gain, or a loss that
must be deferred.28 For practical reasons, it is safe to assume that one or more
intangibles that were acquired in a group will be disposed of within a fifteen-year
275. RIA, supra note 250, 427. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
276. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
277. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
278. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
279. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
280. RIA, supra note 250, 402, at 87.
281. RIA, supra note 250, 1402, at 87.
282. RIA, supra note 250, 402, at 87.
283. RIA, supra note 250, 1402, at 87. See Levy, supra note 3, at 8.
284. Levy, supra note 3, at 8.
285. Levy, supra note 3, at 8.
1994]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
period -the statutory lifetime for § 197 intangibles.286 As a result, it would be
wise for taxpayers to have a contemporaneous valuation of assets upon acquisition
of a business.287
Also, this feature can be viewed as a negative effect of § 197 because the tax-
payer will not be able to reduce its taxable income by a current deduction for the
loss. However, the basis in the remaining group of intangible assets is increased by
the amount of the loss that is disallowed.288 This still results in recovery of the tax-
payer's cost, just over a longer period of time through depreciation deductions.
4. The Effect on One Who Sells a Business
An important factor in any transaction affecting the purchase of a business is
the tax consequences afforded the assets being purchased.289 These tax conse-
quences often affect the amount a buyer is willing to pay for a business.29 To this
end, § 197 has an impact not only on the purchaser of a business, but also on the
seller.291
With the enactment of § 197, a buyer today may be willing to pay more for a
business.292 Prior to the 1993 Act, goodwill was per se nondepreciable under
Treasury Regulation § 1. 167(a)-3.293 Therefore, the value of the goodwill asset of
a business would be diminished in the eyes of the purchaser of a business because
it would not be able to recover the asset's purchase price through subsequent de-
preciation deductions. Section 197 now allows for recovery of this cost through
depreciation, making the asset more valuable to the purchaser,29 4 thereby allowing
the seller of a business to command a higher purchase price.
However, there is a converse effect. Section 197 provides for a uniform fifteen-
year depreciation period, regardless of the actual useful life of the asset.29 If, un-
der § 197, the asset is prescribed a longer useful life than it actually has, a buyer
286. Levy, supra note 3, at 8.
287. Levy, supra note 3, at 8.
288. RIA, supra note 250, 1429, at 104. If the remaining basis in the assets was not increased by the disal-
lowed loss, the taxpayer would never recover the entire basis of the loss asset. CRUMBLEY, supra note 8, at 14-18.
See Levy, supra note 3, at 8.
289. RIA, supra note 250, 403. Prior to the 1993 Act, the buyer and seller in an acquisition transaction would
have differing views on the valuation of the assets being purchased. The buyer would have preferred that the
purchase price be allocated to assets that would give rise to current or future tax deductions, such as depreciable
tangible assets. Walburn, supra note 3, at 477 n. 117. While not likely, the buyer would have preferred a zero
allocation to goodwill since the cost of that asset could not have been recovered until the business was sold or
terminated. Walburn, supra note 3, at 477 n. 117. See supra note 34. On the other hand, the seller would have
preferred that as much of the purchase price as possible be allocated to goodwill, rather than depreciable tangible
assets, because it would have received capital gain treatment on the sale of its goodwill as opposed to ordinary
income on the sale of most of its other assets. Walburn, supra note 3, at 477 n. 117. See also CRUMBLEY, supra
note 8, at 16-25 to 16-26.
290. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
291. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
292. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
293. See supra note 24.
294. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
295. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
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may insist on paying less.296 Since the cost recovery period will be longer, the
buyer will recover his cost less quickly than before the Act. Assuming all taxpay-
ers want to reduce their current tax obligations as much as possible and taking into
account the time value of money,297 the value of assets with a shorter pre- 1993 Act
useful life will be reduced.298
5. The Effect on Professional Practices
A large portion of the purchase price of a professional practice, such as a medi-
cal, dental, or law practice, is typically allocated to goodwill .2" Generally, a mi-
nor portion of the price is allocated to the tangible assets of the practice, with the
remainder considered goodwill.30" Prior to the 1993 Act, this large cost would be
nondepreciable to the purchaser of a professional practice.3"1
Professional practices are not referred to under § 197, but there is no indication
that the goodwill associated with the purchase of a professional practice would be
treated any differently.30 2 As a result, professionals may now be able to take depre-
ciation deductions for the largest portion of the acquisition cost of their practice
that before were unavailable. These deductions will result in a tremendous tax sav-
ings to purchasers of professional practices. While § 197 may require that profes-
sionals be willing to pay more for their practices with their increase in value due to
future allowable depreciation, 30 3 the potential tax savings may well outweigh any
increase in purchase price.
VI. CONCLUSION
Relying on the plain language of § 167 of the Code and the underlying case law,
the Supreme Court reached a logical decision in Newark Morning Ledger. Its inter-
pretation of the applicable Regulation was rational and consistent with the IRS'
position on the depreciability of intangible assets.
Giving merit to the Court's decision, Congress passed the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, allowing for the depreciation of goodwill and other
related intangible assets °.3 4 The new Code section created by that Act has far-
reaching effects on the tax treatment of certain intangible assets, as well as the
overall transactions related to acquiring a business.
296. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
297. Typically, taxpayers "would prefer having a dollar today rather than at some future date because (1) the
risk exists that the future dollar will never be received; and (2) if the dollar is on hand now it can be invested,
resulting in an increase in total dollars possessed at that future date." HERMANSON, supra note 6, at 720. This is
the concept of the time value of money. HERMANSON, supra note 6, at 720. Current deductions from income serve
to reduce a taxpayer's current tax obligation, which in turn increases the taxpayer's current spendable income.
Thus, there is a logical preference for a dollar today rather than tomorrow. HERMANSON, supra note 6, at 720.
298. RIA, supra note 250, 403.
299. RIA, supra note 250, 405.
300. RIA, supra note 250, 405.
301. RIA, supra note 250, 405. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
302. RIA, supra note 250, 405.
303. See supra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.
304. RIA, supra note 250, 402.
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With the opinion handed down by the Supreme Court in Newark Morning
Ledger and the subsequent enactment of § 197, the often-litigated issue of whether
goodwill can be depreciated for tax purposes has been put to rest."' The answer to
that question is a resounding yes!
305. In light of the decision handed down in Newark Morning Ledger, taxpayers that took conservative posi-
tions with regard to customer-based intangibles during any taxable years still open to amendment should file
amended tax returns for those years. Levy, supra note 3, at 10. However, the IRS may try to dispute the taxpay-
er's allocation of the purchase price of a business between tangible assets and depreciable intangible assets since
the statutory period for the latter- 15 years - is longer than the recovery period of most tangible assets. Walburn,
supra note 3, at 483 n. 144.
